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NOTES ON LESZEK KOŁAKOWSKI'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

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Abstract

The article presents the views of the Polish philosopher on the phenomenon of religion. L. Kołakowski devoted almost all his professional life to the topic of religion. He placed the area of religious experiences and beliefs within the framework of transcendentalism, one of the basic and mutually exclusive options of 'transcendentalism - empiricism'. The empirical option encompasses empirical sciences and all naturalistic philosophies, while transcendentalism incorporates supranaturalisms, including religion. The philosophical attempt to go beyond naturalism in grasping the Absolute and the self ends in failure, hence L. Kołakowski indicated religious perception as an area that, while remaining beyond Science, does not contradict its value. The anthropological argument, within which the biologisation of human existence is unjustified, occupied a special place in the analyses of L. Kołakowski.

Keywords: God, subject, sacred, reductionism, truth

1. Introduction

Leszek Kołakowski was a philosopher who, throughout his numerous writings, posed the fundamental question: are empirical sciences able to completely dominate the human relationship with the world? His answer was definite: "We are born into a world of incomprehensible chaos. With time we succeed in acquiring tools which enable us to control that chaos: they are reason and what is known as religion (...). The role of reason is to provide explanations of physical phenomena and enable us to predict and control them, that of religion to reveal the meaning of the world. Religion's ambitions are greater than

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reason's, for religion encompasses the meaning of the whole, and the whole is something reason will never be able to grasp." [1]

Leszek Kołakowski, a Polish philosopher, was born on 23 October 1927 in Radom and died in Oxford on 17 July 2009. He is mainly known from his monumental study *Main Currents of Marxism: Its Origins, Growth and Dissolution* [2]. L. Kołakowski was a theoretician whose work encompassed the history of ideas, epistemology, axiology, but, above all, reflection on religion. His views evolved from empiricism (naturalism in the form of Marxism) to transcendentalism in which religious positions occupy the main place. L. Kołakowski studied Philosophy at the University of Łódź and at the University of Warsaw, where he continued his academic career at the Department of History of Modern Philosophy, as well as at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences. His lecture delivered on 21st October 1966, in which L. Kołakowski criticised the government of the day with respect to the political and economic as well as cultural matters, was met with a strong reaction from the authorities; the philosopher was expelled from the Polish United Workers' Party. In 1968 he was deprived of the right to lecture and publish for his participation in the March events, which forced him to emigrate. During his exile, he taught Philosophy at universities in France, Canada and the USA. In 1970, he came to England, where he continued his professional career at the University of Oxford. This was also where his main works were written, especially *The Presence of Myth* [3] and *Metaphysical Horror* [4]. In the 1990s, L. Kołakowski popularised Philosophy in 30 short lectures on its main problems and in the cycle *What Great Philosophers Ask Us About* [5].

The aim of this article is to present the arguments used by the Polish philosopher, as well as to attempt to assess their value.

2. Religion versus empiricism

L. Kołakowski placed religion (defined below) in the transcendentalist paradigm that opposes empiricism [6]. The specificity of the empirical option is objectified by exact sciences and naturalistic philosophies, while transcendentalism includes all supranaturalist approaches in a broad sense. The philosopher argued that Science, as a set of products in the form of theory, should be understood as an extension of biological defence tools transmitted and accumulated in the form of language [3, p. 111; 7]. Modern science (naturalism) remains a style that has an overwhelming and non-debunk able value [8, 9]. And yet there is a problem in the reasoning which states that only the model of explanation applied in empirical sciences is cognitively valuable. The answer to this problem seems trivial because the achievements of empirical sciences are unquestionable [10]. We can describe how a living cell is able to reproduce itself, foresee a solar eclipse, and the most magnificent temples were built on the basis of engineers' calculations, not on their prayers [8, p. 79-80].

L. Kołakowski in no way rejected the achievements of empirical sciences, but questioned their cognitive exclusivity. "We are going round in a circle. I am asking where this concept of knowledge or cognitive value comes from. On what grounds is a knowledge which fails to meet these requirements excluded?" [8, p. 80] Science, according to the philosopher does not use the concept of truth in the ordinary sense, it only produces criteria according to which something can or cannot be recognised. In turn, there is actually a causal explanation to the question why something is suitable for recognition. Of course, the effectiveness of scientific theories or their predictive power is not in question, but this does not mean that they are the only or decisive criteria of the cognitive value of certain utterances.

In particular, according to the philosopher, the effectiveness of Science and its predictive powers cannot be understood as a criterion of truth. The reason for that is trivial. Theories that postulate specific beings in the world may be effective or may order a large number of phenomena, but sometimes they become forgotten (with their ontology), while this is not the case with the truth of a given judgement. For example, the phlogiston theory was the basis for an effective technique for the production of sulphuric acid, and it also explained, among other things, why bodies burn (they contain phlogiston) or why metals have more common features than their ores. However, it is unlikely that anyone will accept it nowadays. There is no guarantee that this will not be the case with every empirical theory.

When asked what causes a given scientific theory to be practically efficacious while another one is not, the philosopher replied that it is an unsolvable problem if any metaphysical correspondence is implied between the content of speech acts (utterances) and the world in itself [8, p. 85].

Where is the truth, then? But what truth? Philosophers have developed the classical, coherence, pragmatic, evidence and consensus theory of truth. The identity theory states that truth is a special kind of property, namely the identity of the (real) judgement with the fact (M. McDowell). According to J. Szymura's adjuster theory of truth, 'truth' becomes a term used to indicate that the object fully deserves the name it bears [11]. W.V.O. Quine, on the other hand, holds that the function of the phrase 'is true' is to cancel quotation marks ('snow is white') [12]. For Dorothy Gorver, the phrase 'is true' does not function as a predicate in either a semantic or a logical sense - all its applications and uses are task-based (prosentential) [13]. We also have C. Wright's alethic pluralism [14] or W. Alston's alethic objectivity [15]. The understanding of the term of 'truth' by L. Kołakowski was similar to the views of W. Alston. By the truth of an utterance, he meant that something is the case as stated in the utterance [16].

According to L. Kołakowski, maintaining the meaning of the concept of truth and its applicability to cognitive results requires acceptance of the following reasoning. In order for the content of a judgement to be true at all, there must be an infallible and omniscient subject thanks to whose presence the value of the judgements will not change, which is a frequent phenomenon in

Science. In such a mind, however, there is no difference between the cognising subject and the object of cognition; otherwise, it would be prone to error. The absolute subject must therefore be all that it knows [9, p. 88-89]. By postulating the absolute subject as a condition of there being sense in speaking about truth, L. Kołakowski realised that it would not allow us to say which utterance is true [8, p. 88].

But what are the conditions for recognising the existence of the Absolute Mind? According to Kołakowski, we have four paths: through the analysis of the Absolute, through investigations into the nature of the self, through the indirect anthropological argument, and through the 'religious path'. The path through the analysis of the concept of the Absolute was associated with the broadening of the concept of 'experience' so that it was not understood as an experience in empirical sciences. There is no reason, the philosopher thought, to limit oneself only to the sphere determined by these sciences. Important non-scientific experiences include, for example, astonishment at the fact of existence [8, p. 73] or a specific understanding of one's environment.

The objects that we usually experience change, losing their specificity, and eventually disappear as such. Their non-essentiality was traditionally referred to as contingency. L. Kołakowski argued that seeing something as contingent is founded on experience that is distinctive, and as such is similar to distinguishing between red and green, light and heavy, day and night. Contingency cannot be explained by another contingency, which means that the existence of the Absolute being must be accepted [4, p. 18].

3. Man in search of the Absolute

Philosophers have done and are still doing a lot to depict the nature of the Absolute without the help of Revelation or specific religious acts. The Absolute as a condition of truth and existence per se in philosophical terms, argued L. Kołakowski, remains and must remain pure actuality (it does not allow us to distinguish what it is from what it may be); it is unchanging, complete, ideal, timeless and perfectly simple.

Unfortunately, it was not possible to develop an analogous language acceptable enough to express the nature of the Absolute. What is more, the more people became aware of the inadequacy of human languages, the more they focused on describing the Absolute in purely negative terms. The Neoplatonist Damascius probably went the furthest in refusing to ascribe to the Absolute those notions which are stretched to the limit and when absolutized (absolute simplicity, absolute completeness), cease to mean anything or, as in Hegel, they mean everything and nothing (pure Being and pure Non-Being are the same) [4, p. 48].

Attempts to depict what is doubtless and necessary on the part of the subject ended in a similar failure. From the Cartesian subject through Existence in the existential trend, to the pure self in Husserl and even in the realistic neo-

Thomist philosophy, attempts to determine the subject lead to its 'contentlessness' [17]. For L. Kołakowski, this implied metaphysical horror - if nothing truly exists apart from the Absolute, the Absolute is nothing, and if nothing truly exists apart from me, I myself am nothing (as explained/understood above) [4, p. 21].

L. Kołakowski also drew the attention to the specificity of the human being. Man, unlike other living beings, is able to relate objectively to himself which, according to the philosopher, had significant consequences. "(...) because human beings have become objects for their own consciousness, they have become incomprehensible for themselves as subjects. In this bifurcation the subjectivity has ceased to be a part of nature, and biological determinations, to the extent that they are components of self-awareness, have ceased to be natural; they demand an interpretation." [3, p. 116] And so, death is a common phenomenon, but for people, acts of anxiety (not fear) [18] modify the timeliness of experiencing it by referring it to the dimension of being-toward-death. Love ceases to be only a sexual desire, good becomes something other than mere utility [19], and the search for truth exceeds only effectiveness or empirical confirmation, claimed L. Kołakowski [20].

The philosopher asked, how did creatures whose needs were supposedly limited to finding food, acts of copulation, and protecting themselves from the elements, and who supposedly invented art and religion to better satisfy the necessities of life, for unknown reasons began to value these inventions for themselves? Why did other animals with which we share needs not write *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (or something similar)? "Briefly, we naturally believe in the discontinuity of the life tree or in a separate *fiat* which brought us into existence" [4, p. 114]. All biologically interpretable needs in humans are 'additionally meaningful'.

L. Kołakowski used the concept of 'additional meaning' following the interpretation of hermeneutics, where this additional meaning is not psychological (subjective), nor can it be reduced to the existing (objective) meaning - a meaning which Hegel was probably the first to have identified as a separate realm of existence! [4, p. 114-115]. Unfortunately, the philosopher did not develop this extremely interesting theoretical thread, but focused his attention on the area of religion. The earlier views of L. Kołakowski from the period of Marxist dogmatism will be omitted. An excellent introduction to this period is the chapter 'Wobec marksizmu' [21]. He did not undertake to give a real definition, instead proposing the phrase "the socially established worship of the eternal reality" [7, p. 12]. When it comes to the cognitive value of religious content, L. Kołakowski drew attention to early anthropological research, where it was assumed that religious myths convey a kind of false beliefs in the form of 'explaining' incomprehensible natural phenomena or distorted information on tribal history [7, p. 13-14]. This was followed by the interpretation of magic as a pseudo-technique, compensating for practical inability with seemingly efficient means.

Another trend that goes back to Epicurus sees the source of religion in the fear of death and suffering, as well as in the introduction of a cognitive order to the surrounding phenomena, which alleviates cognitive anxiety. In the twentieth century, on the other hand, scholars of religion emphasised social rather than cognitive functions of myths and their role in the integration of societies or the control of collective emotions. L. Kołakowski believed all functionalist approaches assume implicitly or explicitly that the language of myth is translatable into the language used by the researcher, i.e. the language of empirical sciences. In other words, the language of myth is to reveal certain 'secular' meanings that are hidden in mythologies. Secondly, naturalistic approaches assume that the anthropologist correctly reads this hidden, profane sense, while the myth is a kind of self-deception, an illusion or simple ignorance. But such assumptions, according to L. Kołakowski, are not derived from empirical anthropological material - they are arbitrary. The problem of the definition of religion is discussed in detail by W. Cohen, M.E. Sapiro, E. Pine, F.J. Streng [22]. There is no denying that religion performs various functions, for example, it alleviates the fear of death (though does it always?), but it does not logically follow from such functions [8, p. 14].

4. Faith as an act of trust

The philosopher thought that one should look at the phenomenon of religion not from the aspect of its function, but rather from the description of the phenomenon. People are initiated into a specific cult and assimilate its language by their participation in the life of the community and not by rational persuasion. Faith, and especially faith in the existence of God, is an act of trust that precedes all reasoning. However, the trust necessary in an act of faith is an act of moral rather than intellectual commitment [8, p. 33-34]. But what kind of commitment is that? It is not trust based on reasons, but personal trust. "But personal trust is something different (...). In general, it is not a conviction but the acceptance of another person in toto, without reasons, without the need for justification or calculation." [3, p. 45]

The sentence above is crucial for L. Kołakowski's understanding of religion, faith and, to a certain extent, philosophising, as long as such acts are non-empirical. In the empirical sense, 'factual' trust is one where we trust that the other person has shown certain traits and is therefore trustworthy. But personal trust is something different, the philosopher claimed. It allows the experience of another as a whole given "(...) directly in (...) nonempirical personal properties, in its freedom, and its absolute Being" [3, p. 45]. Those who do not perform such acts, or do not suppose they make sense, will never 'enter' the world of religious faith. When this happens however, the believer begins to literally see the signs of God in their life and environment. They are perceived in the same way as the doctor sees interstitial lesions on an X-ray or the lab technician sees that contacts are well cleaned.

However, merely performing certain acts is not enough to demonstrate their value. L. Kołakowski draws attention to a special type of experience - the experience of the sacred. It is, according to him, "(...) the way of perception [in which] cognitive insight, the feeling of being part of a universal order ruled by providential wisdom and the acceptance of a moral obligation are one" [8, p. 176]. The experience of the sacred is closely related to the concept of prohibition and neither of them falls under the jurisdiction of empirical sciences. They constitute a quality of 'good and evil' different from suffering, pain or death, which we know as natural facts. By violating a prohibition (sinning), we experience something specific to religious perception. We experience a kind of 'decay of the world' which, given the fact that being and good are interchangeable, according to Kołakowski, is nothing other than the destruction of being itself. Conversely, doing good (in a religious sense) creates being.

L. Kołakowski introduced here the idea of *Deus historicus*, a God who is 'immersed' in the world and who grows or crumbles with it (as a being). This 'immersion' is not emanationism traditionally negated by many theologians, but only an emphasis on the dependence of individuals on God; such dependence as demonstrated by the *creatio ex nihilo* - after all, God had nothing other than 'himself' as a material for the creation of the world. The experience of the sacred is followed by the specificity of the language of religion. It is a language with specifically defined standards of identification. In this language, for example, we can say that rain is God, but not that God is rain. The wafer (oblatum) may be Jesus, but Jesus is never a wafer. Christians have never claimed that there is some mysterious chemical transformation of bread into flesh while refusing to accept that the wafer is a kind of reminder. "In particular circumstances, defined by the religious tradition, signs are - instead of simply representing - what they signify." [8, p. 166]

When explaining the meaning of the Eucharist, Christians do not express themselves metaphorically: they refer to real events, although of course empirically unverifiable. The philosopher thought that the language of the sacred, though specific, is not in a worse situation than the language of physicists or doctors. L. Kołakowski also - or, perhaps, above all - attributed to this language an epistemological sense. This is because when we experience sacredness, we experience a certain synthesis, a participation in the ultimate reality (whether or not one related to a personal god and at the same time, a moral obligation to behave in a certain way [8, p. 175]. Thus, to give an example outside Christian belief - a follower of Hinduism does not understand the principle of Karma in the same way that he perceives the law of Thermodynamics, which he can then employ in various technical manipulations but, according to L. Kołakowski's thought, experiences karmicity in one act, in which he acknowledges his guilt (desire) and begins the conduct aiming at the release from the past, and finally from the wheel of changes. When God is spoken of as Principium and His word as Moral Law, it is inseparable. Saying that 'the truth will make us free', Jesus did not mean mastering certain skills or

techniques. "(...) for Him, and for all great religious teachers, people realize the nature of their bondage in the same act of illumination that includes the means of shaking it off and the understanding of the divinely ordained destiny of the world. By saying that Nirvana is the destruction of craving, Buddha does not provide us with the 'definition' of a metaphysical entity but shows man's goal as it 'verily is'." [8, p. 219]

L. Kołakowski also stressed the importance of the mystical experience, which is an indispensable but elite part of religious experience [8, p. 117]. It is only in the mystical union that God ceases to be speculatively defined, remaining the eternal, infinite and living foundation of being. Of course, this experience cannot be conveyed in its original quality. Obviously, for an empirically oriented subject, all of the above 'does not make sense'. The language of the myth, thought L. Kołakowski, is 'a <wholly other> world' whose description seems untranslatable into the language of identification of physical events - it has different rules for interpreting the concatenation of phenomena, as well as different laws of causality [8, p. 166-167]. There is no simple transformation of secular joys and desires into what constitutes the core of religious life - divine infinity, eternity, the randomness of the world, mystical illumination, and the distinction between good and evil.

Thus, we have two main options: empiricism (more broadly, naturalism) and religion (more broadly, transcendentalism). As soon as we make a choice, a given option will immediately appear to be more valuable. "If there is no God, empirical criteria alone have to guide our thinking, and empirical criteria do not lead to God; if God exists, He gives us clues about how to perceive His hand in the course of events, and with the help of those clues we recognize the divine sense of whatever happens" [8, p. 203]. However, according to L. Kołakowski, the choice between the two options is neither arbitrary nor random. Specifically, since we do not have a theory of cognition that would be without assumptions, non-dogmatic and indisputable, the choice is logically, but not historically, arbitrary. It is the state of civilisation at a given historical moment that leads to the choice of certain options.

5. Remarks

The distinction proposed by L. Kołakowski between transcendentalism (religion) and empirical (naturalistic) options is very useful for a broad approach to various currents and theoretical standpoints. A similar distinction was proposed by Józef Życiński [23]. However, the philosopher reduced naturalistic options to empirical sciences only, which narrows his field of consideration. L. Kołakowski conceived Science in a strong instrumentalist sense (weak instrumentalism is defined in relation to the so-called theoretical entities), but he does not argue for such an assumption, which seems to be a disadvantage in his reflection.

According to the philosopher, in the field of empirical sciences the concept of truth is inapplicable. In a way, it is hard to deny. In his analyses of the status of Science, A. Grobler follows J. Watkins in distinguishing truth as a kind of goal that has to be attained (1), as approaching such a goal (2) and the truth that can be pursued without the necessity to ascertain how close one has got to it (3). "Laudan is presumably right in saying that truth is an unattainable cognitive result both in the sense (1) and (2). However, there are no obstacles to considering the truth, as suggested by Watkins, to be a type (3) goal." [24]

L. Kołakowski also declared the biologisation of the human being in the area of empiricism (naturalism). Meanwhile, its representatives, such as D. Dennett [25], J. Searle [26], and even "the devil's advocate", R. Dawkins [27], refrain from such a reduction. The transgressive concept of man, although naturalistic, allows truth, good or the idea of eternity as a kind of intransgressible norm towards which man can strive. However, though norms they are not realisable - they are ideals created by people [28]. L. Kołakowski wrote about faith and personal trust as "the acceptance of another person in toto, without reasons, without the need for justification" [29]. Basing faith on an act that is so difficult to explicate makes it impossible to give a rationale for the content of faith.

The experience of the sacred in the view of L. Kołakowski, is a specific act in which the cognitive insight (judgement), the sense of belonging to the order established by the Absolute, and the acceptance of the moral obligation, are combined into one whole. The problem is that such an experience makes religious perception somewhat excluded from non-religious approaches. Many critics accused the Polish philosopher that in this way he prevented any understanding of the religious message from an external perspective [30].

Unfortunately, the philosopher himself did not respond to such criticisms. It should be assumed that he did not exclude the subjects outside the religious faith from understanding its content. He rather meant a specific sense of belonging of people who experience the sacred and, consequently, the way of conceiving the world. The naturalist can understand the content of religious experience quite well, but it has no role to play in his life. In this sense, a religious person and a naturalist do not share a certain area of experience.

The depiction of the specificity of religion did not go hand in hand with L. Kołakowski's indication of what the cognitive criteria of religious perception are. It is true that they are not scientific in the current understanding of the sciences, but actually L. Kołakowski admitted almost complete helplessness in demonstrating the cognitive aspects of religious beliefs. In the proposals of, for example, Michał Heller [31], such cognitive content may appear and it does appear, as can be seen in his comparison of Science and Theology. Science, says M. Heller, is an unusual but very complicated creation whose results are not reduced to technological control over the world, as L. Kołakowski wanted. The subject of research of mathematised natural sciences is the Universe, and the goal is to understand it [31, p. 36]. M. Heller does not focus so much on

Theology as on the theology of Science. "The task of the theology of Science is theological reflection on Science" [31, p. 36]. This reflection reveals that the claims of Theology, e.g. the creation of the world by God, remain outside the competences of empirical sciences. However, if God created the world, we have the opportunity to obtain information that sciences will not provide. Moreover, in the perspective of Theology, the scholar seeks solutions that already exist, so he does not get lost in the epistemological labyrinth. The very search for understanding the world does not consist, as emphasised by M. Heller, in the analysis of problems that Science is currently unable to explain (as happens in the Intelligent Design). "The whole Project is the handprint of the Creator, and that is its meaning." [31, p. 73] There is a goal inherent in this Project, hence questions such as 'God or chance' do not make sense. "From the theological point of view, opposing God to chance is a serious mistake. It assumes that God does not control chance, that it works against God. (...) There are simply no chance events in God's perspective." [31, p. 77]

Thus, Theology can, in a sense, establish norms for scientific research, which in turn provides important information for Theology. For example, biblical scholars should be grateful for revealing what we know about the origin and evolution of the world, because by avoiding literality we better understand the story of the creation of the world.

When it comes to the relationship between Theology and Science, there are many positions. In some of them, as in the analyses of L. Kołakowski, we have 'wholly other worlds'. In others, which now only have historical value, theology is a collection of nonsensical statements. M. Heller refers, among others, to D. Lambert with his distinction between concordism, discordism and articulation, that is, such a conjunction that provides the possibility of independent freedom of movement [31, p. 16]. D. Lambert advocates the interplay between Science and Theology without compromising their methodological separateness [32]. In the act of creation, the world and God are united despite, of course, the fundamental difference between the Absolute and the reality that is (being) created.

M. Heller sympathises with M. Tałasiewicz's radical thesis [31, p. 51] regarding the mutual incorporation of Science and Theology. Science presents facts and theology listens and reflects on the use of this knowledge for a better understanding of Revelation. It seems that the path proposed by M. Heller is more theoretically fertile for the understanding of the relationships between Science and religion than that presented by L. Kołakowski.

6. Conclusions

The chief merit of Kołakowski's analyses is the emphasis on the limitations of the naturalistic (i.e. presented by the exact sciences) view of the world. He does not negate the technological effectiveness of these sciences (empiricism). However, he finds them futile when it comes to solving unique

problems that people face. Moreover, he indicates that there is no neutral ground, which could make it possible to show the theoretical superiority of one option over the other (e.g. the emipirical one over the transcendentalist, including religious stances). It is worth mentioning that Richard Rorty, who took the opposite theoretical position, in the case of the status of empirical sciences came to the same conclusion after detailed analyses [33]. Apart from recognizing the meaning of man's openness to transcendence, Kołakowski also points to specific values of this approach (see below).

Religion, unlike exact sciences, 'embraces the meaning of the whole', places man in the widest possible view of the world and, what is more, draws up a plan of his salvation. The religious message is that man is as such irreparably weak, that certain sources of suffering are somehow inscribed in human nature, but at the same time it satisfies the need to escape the misery of 'being historical' or contingent, by pointing people toward what is changeless [8, p. 184]. Without religion, we do not find good and evil different from empirically experienced pain and suffering. And then it is always possible for nihilism to win. It is worth emphasising, as J. Kłoczowski noted, that founding ethics on the experience of the sacred does not have to lead to a repressive form [21, p. 299].

The experience of prohibition and its violation is an extremely important warning against introducing disorder and chaos into the world in which we live. Without the Absolute, the idea of (transcendental) truth makes no sense, and if there is no God, everything is permissible. Participation in the order defined by religion enables healthy OR true personal relationships, in contrast to those based on expected profit. The very idea of proving one's faith is self-contradictory. Since faith is based on personal trust, it would be contradictory to legitimise such trust.

Religion and some philosophies arise as a result of the specificity of being human. And man cannot be reduced to a collection of atoms or survival and reproduction. Therefore, people have to be trans-empirical. On the other hand, L. Kołakowski thought that the believer cannot rationally explain their view of the world, is unable to say why the self-sufficient Absolute created the world, and how to understand that God is both the Absolute and a person. The believer also does not know how God interfered with evolutionary processes by modifying natural selection, nor how to reconcile God's grace and the blind laws of nature. Religion also does not know why nature produces so much suffering without any apparent need. The believer should admit that the contents of their faith are not and cannot be a scientific hypothesis.

While accepting the transcendentalist (religious) option advocated by Kołakowski, we find his analyses (only sketched in his works) worth developing. Therefore, in the last paragraphs we refer to Michal Heller's propositions.

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